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COMMISSIONED WORKS AS WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT:
MISINTERPRETATION AND INJUSTICE
MARCI A. HAMILTONt
The Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act")1 has been unflatteringly
described "as an immensely complex package of expedients and com-
promises altogether unillumined by any conceptual thought or princi-
ple."2 In fact, the revision process which gave rise to the 1976 Act was
not predominated by scholars, evoking timeless principles against which
each new provision was measured. Rather, in a robustly American
way, it was the product of the striking of a series of compromises over
an extended period of time.' For the drafters,
[T]here was no single model for anything. The basic drafting
approach was to decide what to say and then to say it
... .[Since the proposals] reflected deliberate choices be-
tween alternatives, based on past proposals from contending
interests, the Copyright Office's initial drafts were in fact
compromises even before they met the light of day.4
The work-made-for-hire 5 provisions with respect to commissioned
works provide one of the clearest examples of the copyright revision's
compromise process. From the first preliminary draft of the 1976 Act
in which no commissioned works would have been considered as works
made for hire to the final version in which nine categories of commis-
sioned works had been added to the work-made-for-hire provisions,
t B.A. (English & Philosophy) 1979, Vanderbilt University; M.A. (Philosophy)
1982, M.A. (English) 1984, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. Candidate 1988,
University of Pennsylvania.
' Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1982)).
' Whale, Copyright and Authors Rights, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., Feb. 1979,
at 38, 38-39.
1 Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 13 COPYRIGHT 187, 188
(1977).
4 Id.
5 The precise definition of "work made for hire" under the 1976 Act is at issue in
this Comment, but generally, the term refers to works created by employees within the
context of an employment relationship. The term is also applicable to certain types of
independent contractors. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. Commissioned
works are those works prepared by independent contractors pursuant to agreement
with a hiring party.
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publishers and artists compromised, debated, and entered into further
compromises. But the compromises were based upon the publishers'
and artists' conjectures about the operation of the provisions. The prac-
tical import of the compromises could not be known until the law went
into effect in 1978. While publishers have by and large been pleased
with the treatment of commissioned works under the 1976 Act, artists
have become increasingly disenchanted with the operation of the 1976
Act's commissioned work-made-for-hire provisions.6
This Comment argues that the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire
provisions should be amended to provide greater protection for commis-
sioned artists creating what are now considered works made for hire.
Part I discusses the work-made-for-hire provisions in the Copyright
Act of 1909 ("1909 Act")' and their judicial interpretation. Part II re-
counts the legislative history leading up to the work-made-for-hire pro-
visions governing commissioned works under the 1976 Act. In addition,
it delineates the two judicial interpretations that have been advanced,
arguing that one obviates the 1976 amendments. Part III chronicles
how the 1976 Act has failed to provide adequate protection for the cre-
ators of commissioned works and proposes legislative amendments that
would remedy the shortcomings of the present Act.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE
PROVISIONS
A. 1909 Copyright Law Provisions Governing
Works Made for Hire
Congress's power to grant copyright in artistic works can be found
in article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, which states that Congress
has power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."" The Constitution
thereby grounds United States copyright law in a tension between stim-
ulating the artist to create and limiting the artist's monopoly in the
work.9 One way to understand the essence of the constitutional directive
6 See, e.g., Haynes, The Copyright Law: Seeking a Change for the Free-lancer,
Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 25, 1987, (Books/Leisure), at 16, col. 1 ("The new law didn't
work the way everybody thought it would .... ).
I Pub. L. No. 60-349, 60 Stat. 1075 (1909), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
8 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
' As two congressional reports on copyright law have stated:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the
constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
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is to contrast it with the laws of a country in which moral or personal
rights rather than economic rights are the focus of copyright protection.
For example, in the French system of copyright, an author's right to
copyright resides in notions akin to natural rights. The artist has le-
gally enforceable personal rights in the work; mere creation of the
work, not the public benefit drawn from creation, forms the ground on
which an author is protected.1 ° Although Congress between the 1909
Act and the 1976 Act subtly shifted the focus from public benefit to
author remuneration, 1 United States copyright law still exists primar-
ily to serve the public by ensuring the maximal amount of artistic
production.
Prior to passage of the 1909 Act,12 no explicit statutory provisions
dealt with works made for hire or works made under commission. At
common law, however, there was a presumption of the employer's own-
ership of the copyright. An artist working under commission could re-
tain copyright in her works only by reserving those rights pursuant to
contract. 3 For example, in Dielman v. White, 4 decided in 1900, the
Circuit Court of the District of Massachusetts stated:
[W]hen an artist is commissioned to execute a work of art
not in existence at the time the commission is given, the bur-
den of proving that he retains a copyright in the work of art
executed, sold, and delivered under the commission rests
heavily upon the artist himself. If a patron gives a commis-
writings ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted .... In
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit
the public and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimen-
tal to the public?
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 5
(Comm. Print 1961) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909)); see
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
[copyright clause of the Constitution] is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare . . ").
10 See Frangon and Ginsburg, Authors' Rights in France: The Moral Right of the
Creator of a Commissioned Work to Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the
Work, 9 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381, 383 (1985).
11 See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing the 1976 Act's concern
that authors receive their just reward).
2 For a brief, but accurate history of copyright law leading up to the Constitution
and through the 1909 hearings, see Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,
318 U.S. 643, 647-56 (1943).
13 See, e.g., Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., Inc., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.
1939) (common law rule is that copyright passes to parton unless arist can prove the
parties intended otherwise).
U4 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
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sion to an artist, there appears to me a very strong implica-
tion that the work of art commissioned is to belong unreserv-
edly and without limitation to the patron ....
[However] it is doubtless possible, by apt expressions in
the contract, for the artist to retain the copyright for
himself.x5
During the hearings culminating in the 1909 Act, the seeds for the
current work-made-for-hire provisions (and controversies) were
planted. First, the principle was advanced that the payment of a salary
to an employee "entitle[d] an employer to all rights to obtain a copy-
right in any work performed during the hours for which such salary
[was] paid."' 6 In other words, the salaried employee, implicitly the full-
time employee, should automatically lose rights in her work. Second, a
distinction was made between employees and independent artists:
[T]he right belonging to that artist who is employed for the
purpose of making a work of art so many hours a day, or
that literary producer who is employed for so many hours,
should be very different from the right that is held by the
independent artist or man who makes a painting for art's
sake. 
7
This recognition of a difference between independent contractors and
salaried employees gave rise to a controversy that continues to haunt
the work-made-for-hire provisions to this day: how does one distinguish
the employee from the independent artist? The 1909 Act provided little
guidance to the court trying to make this decision; it merely stated that
"the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made
for hire."' During the amendment process, these difficulties were rec-
ognized, and a full definition clause was requested to clarify this and
15 Id. at 894-95.
1" Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Librarian's Conf. on Copyright,
2d Sess. 65 (Nov. 1-4, 1905) [hereinafter Librarian's Conf.], reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT at 65 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds.
1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (statement of Mr. A.W. Elson of A.W. El-
son & Co., educational art publishers). Salary did not persist as the sole criterion of the
employer's investment. See Note, The Freelancer's Trap: Work for Hire Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 1305, 1315-16 (1984) (analyzing case law
developments and legislative proposals concerning the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire
provisions up to 1984).
17 Librarian's Conf., supra note 16, at 188 (statement of Mr. A. Beverly Smith,
Lithographers' Ass'n (East)), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY supra, note 16, at
188.
18 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976).
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similar vague or uncertain terms.1" But no definition clause was ever
added.
The legislative history of the work-made-for-hire provisions in the
1909 Act reveals that participants in the amendment process distin-
guished between employees, in the customary sense of the word, and
independent contractors.20 Nevertheless, courts eventually declined to
spend the time drawing such distinctions. In the early cases involving
commissioned works, the courts generally applied the Dielman stan-
dard: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the copyright was pre-
sumed to vest in the commissioning party.2 The early employer-em-
ployee cases, on the other hand, developed several tests to determine
whether an employment relationship existed.22 By the mid-1960's,
however, courts were applying the tests developed for employer-em-
ployee cases to cases involving independent contractors.
In 1966, in the seminal case involving independent contractors,
Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,23 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the work-made-for-hire
doctrine applied "whenever an employee's work is produced at the in-
stance and expense of his employer." '24 The court commented that it
could "see no sound reason why these same principles [regarding works
created by a salaried employee] are not applicable when the parties
bear the relationship of employer and independent contractor."2 Six
19 See Miscellaneous Amends. to S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Proposed to the Copy-
right Office, reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at M55 (amend-
ment proposed by Mr. H. Bentwich).
20 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. After passage of the 1909 Act, the
majority of the early cases involving commissioned works concerned photographs, espe-
cially portraits. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPY-
RIGHT LAw REVISION, Study 13, 127, 130 (Comm. Print 1960) (report by B.
Varmer), reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 717, 722 (The Copyright Society of
U.S.A. eds. 1963) [hereinafter VARMER]; see, e.g., Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib-
uting Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922); Altman v. New
Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113 (D. Conn. 1918). In the photography cases, the courts
focused on the relationship between the parties to determine their respective rights in
copyright. Therefore, although the courts held that the contract implied that the por-
trait's copyright resided in the sitter, when "the photograph is taken at the expense of
the photographer and for his benefit, the sitter loses control of the disposition of the
pictures, and the property right is in the photographer." Altman, 254 F. at 118.
21 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(B)(2)(c), at 5-21 (23d ed.
1986).
22 See generally Note, supra note 16, at 1313-16.
23 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that in absence of express agreement to
the contrary, copyright resides in advertisers paying newspaper's employees to create
ads, not in newspaper).
24 Id. at 567.
25 Id. at 568.
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years later, in Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,26 the Second Circuit
again refused to distinguish between employees and independent con-
tractors, asserting that: "[t]he purpose of the statute is not to be frus-
trated by conceptualistic formulations of the employment relation-
ship. 12 7 Thus, because of the courts' refusal to plug the gap left by
Congress's failure to define "employer," the same standards applied to
employees' works made for hire were eventually applied to commis-
sioned works made for hire.28
Of those tests devised by the courts to apply the work-made-for-
hire provisions of the 1909 Act,29 the one most relevant to this Com-
ment concerns the employer's right to supervise."0 The majority and the
dissent in Scherr v. Universal Match Corp." delineated the two ways
of analyzing the supervision issue. In Scherr, two ex-servicemen
brought a copyright infringement suit against a matchbook manufac-
turer and the United States government. During their regular duty
hours spent in the army as illustrators preparing visual aids for train-
ing, the plaintiffs created a statue to which they affixed a copyright
notice. Several months after the unveiling, they registered their claim of
copyright. 2 They sued when they discovered a picture of the statue on
matchbooks. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit formulated
the test to determine whether the statue was a work made for hire,
stating, "The essential factor in determining whether an employee cre-
ated his work of art within the scope of his employment as part of his
employment duties is whether the employer possessed the right to direct
and to supervise the manner in which the work was being per-
28 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
27 Id. at 1216.
28 Lower federal courts are not the only courts to refuse to address the meaning of
the 1909 Act's work-made-for-hire provisions. The Supreme Court has not addressed
the work-made-for-hire issue since 1903, when it decided the landmark case of Bleis-
tein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (holding circus adver-
tisement designs belong to employer because plaintiff's employees produced the advert-
isment). See Note, supra note 16, at 1318-19.
29 For discussion of the various tests created by the courts, see Note, supra note
16, at 1313-16.
"0 See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. In addition to the supervision test
discussed throughout this Comment, another widely used test was the "instance and
expense" test. See, e.g., Brattelboro, 369 F.2d at 567 ("[Tjhe 'works for hire' doctrine
... is applicable whenever an employee's work is produced at the instance and ex-
pense of his employer."). The instance and expense test was the judicial response to the
1909 Act drafters' notion that employers deserved copyright in works for which they
supplied the salary, the overhead, and the incentive to create works. See supra notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
31 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
2 Id. at 498-99. Plaintiffs had begun work independently on the statue while
serving as illustrators, but were subsequently requested by their deputy-commander to
devote all of their duty hours to a larger version of the statue. Id.
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formed.""3 The court concluded that the government did possess such a
right, even though its exercise of the right was "limited." The govern-
ment's right to supervise in conjunction with its appropriation of funds,
time, and facilities established that the work was a work made for hire.
Therefore, the district court's dismissal of complainant's action Was
affirmed.34
In his dissent, Judge Friendly advocated a limited use of the su-
pervision test to determine copyright ownership in situations where the
employer's creative contribution was substantial.3 5 In short, he believed
a supervision test was justified when the employer's creative input was
substantial. Judge Friendly objected, however, to granting rights to em-
ployers in works made for hire when the employer made no significant
creative contribution. In those cases, since the employer was no longer
the creator, the supervision test was unjustified. 6 Thus, he provided his
own explanation of why copyright in a work should belong to the em-
ployer even if she did not exercise her right to supervision, such as in
the cases of commissioned works. He stated that even when the em-
ployer did not exercise such control, it was "not unreasonable to assume
. . . that the parties expected the purchaser to wind up owning the
work . . . and that the artist set his price accordingly."3 7 Judge
Friendly dissented in Scherr because he believed that the government-
serviceman relationship did not provide such a reasonable inference. In
short, he objected to the use of the supervision test unless the quantum
of the employer's input was substantial; when it was not, he urged the
use of a rebuttable presumption of the parties' intent, strongly reminis-
cent of the Dielman standard.38
" Id. at 500; see also Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978)
(emphasizing that the right to supervise, regardless of whether the right was in fact
exercised, was determinative as to whether a work was a work made for hire under the
1909 Act).
14 Scherr, 417 F.2d at 501.
35 Id. at 502 ("Where the employer in fact tells the employee pretty much what to
do, vesting copyright in the former is wholly consistent with the policy of the Copyright
Act since the creativity can be said to be primarily the employer's and the employee has
simply carried out his instructions.") (Friendly, J., dissenting).
38 Id.; cf. Samet v. Wells, 185 U.S.P.Q. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding supervision
test inapplicable to commissioned works, which were presumed to be works made for
hire).
37 Scherr, 417 F.2d at 502 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
38 See id.; ef. supra note 15 and accompanying text (quoting the Dielman stan-
dard). The presumption of the parties' intent articulated by Judge Friendly in Scherr
was adopted by other courts to determine if a work was a work made for hire. See, e.g.,
May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1980)
("[W]hen an employer hires an employee or an independent contractor to produce
work of an artistic nature, the courts will presume in the absence of contrary proof that
the parties expected the employer to own the copyright and that the artist set his price
1987]
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Judge Friendly's dissenting opinion in Scherr represented a depar-
ture from existing law, since, under most judicial constructions of the
1909 Act, the extent of the employer's participation in the creation of
the work was usually immaterial. In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Bryan,39 for example, the employee argued that the meaning of the
phrase, "work for hire," "does not include works of which employees
are the real authors, but only those to which they made some ancillary
contribution to the 'employer' who is the chief author."40 Judge
Learned Hand refused to determine the work-made-for-hire issue ac-
cording to the relative contributions of the employee and employer,
stating that such a definition would reduce the application of the work-
made-for-hire doctrine to only those situations in which the employee
would have been a co-author, absent the work-made-for-hire provi-
sions. He determined that "[t]he 'work' intended is clearly any 'work'
which, but for the employment, the employee could have himself copy-
righted; not a work in which his rights would have given him only a
joint interest in the copyright." '41 On Judge Hand's terms, if the work-
made-for-hire determination were based on the relative contributions of
the employee and employer, then the reasoning would be no different
from a determination of joint authorship, and the work-made-for-hire
clause in the 1909 Act would have been redundant.
Under Judge Hand's reasoning, Judge Friendly's casting of the
supervision test in terms of the quantum of the employer's contribution
would have written the work-made-for-hire provisions out of the
statute. Judge Friendly neatly side-stepped the work-made-for-fire is-
sue altogether by adopting the joint ownership doctrine and invoking
contract principles.
The Scherr majority, however, implemented the supervision test
for the purpose of determining whether an employment relationship ex-
isted that could justify designation of the statue as a work made for hire
according to the 1909 Act.42 Two commentators later described the ma-
jority's use of the supervision test to identify an employment
relationship:
The right of the employer to direct and supervise the
manner in which the work is performed has been deemed the
accordingly." (citing Scherr, 417 F.2d at 502 (Friendly, J., dissenting))).
39 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941).
40 Id. at 700.
41 Id. Judge Hand referred to the employees' argument as "the merest invention,
fabricated in the teeth of the statute." Id.
42 See Scherr, 417 F.2d at 501 ("[I]f an employer-employee relationship between
the Government and these plaintiffs actually existed, any ownership in the work
designed by plaintiffs necessarily belongs to the Government.").
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"crucial question" and the "hallmark of 'an employment for
hire' relationship." Consequently, when an alleged employer
does not have the right to direct, control, or supervise the
work of an author, there exists no employment
relationship.4
B. Revision of the 1909 Copyright Act: Creating
Copyright Law Anew
While the courts refused to recognize the distinction between com-
missioned works and those made within an employment relationship,
44
a variety of bills were introduced that would have excluded commis-
sioned works from operation of the work-made-for-hire provisions. 43 In
his 1958 study prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights as part of the copyright law revision begun in the
1950's, Borge Varmer asserted that there was little reason to change
the copyright law by mentioning commissioned works, largely because
the only cases concerning commissioned works decided up to that time
under the 1909 Act were the photographer/sitter cases.4" Although he
did not advocate adopting a separate rule for commissioned works, 47 he
stated that such a rule could be justified on the grounds that "the com-
mon law generally has differentiated between the employer-employee
relationship and that of the parties to a contract for a commissioned
product."148 According to Varmer, such a distinction was acceptable be-
cause an employer usually provides "more direction and exercises more
4' Angel & Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 209, 223 (1976) (quoting Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522
F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding evidence insufficient to prove there was adequate
supervision to constitute relationship making works at issue works made for hire), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) and 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 62.2, at
238.2-239 (14th ed. 1976)).
"' See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
45 See VARMER, supra note 20, at 131-35.
48 See id. at 130. Varmer's report was written before the Second Circuit's decision
in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966), which greatly expanded the application of the work-made-for-hire doctrine to
commissioned works. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing the
Brattleboro decision). For a discussion of the photographer/sitter cases, see supra note
20.
'" Varmer's analysis, focusing on the right of the commissioning party to supervise
the work, in many ways foreshadows the test adopted by the majority in Scherr. Com-
pare Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500 (majority work-made-for-hire test) with VARMER, supra
note 20, at 142 ("Both classes of works [employee and commissioned] are produced for,
pursuant to the initiative and order of, and against payment by, a person other than the
creator.").
4 VARMER, supra note 20, at 142.
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control over the work of his employee than does a commissioner with
respect to the work of an independent contractor."49 He thus foreshad-
owed the Scherr dissent's consideration of the amount of the empioyer's
supervision as a criterion for determining whether a work was a work
made for hire.
The copyright law revision begun in the 1950's lasted for more
than twenty years. It is perhaps most important to an interpretation of
the provisions of the 1976 Act to comprehend the nature of the project
the Copyright Office and eventually Congress undertook in revising the
copyright law. Congress intended not merely to amend the 1909 Act,
but rather to overhaul the copyright law. Ms. Barbara Ringer, Register
of Copyrights at the time, observed:
When it was originally drafted in the early 1960's, the
bill that eventually became the Act of 1976 was not based on
pre-existing legislation, least of all the Act of 1909. Before
embarking on its drafting efforts the Copyright Office had
engaged in an extensive research project . . . . These studies
included consideration of the history and wording of the
copyright statutes of other countries, of international conven-
tions on copyright, and of the long series of earlier revision
bills ....
[The Act's provisions] reflected deliberate choices be-
tween alternatives . . ..
Thus, the Copyright Office and Congress envisioned their project as
one that would establish a "new" copyright system. With a new system
of copyright came a somewhat different set of purposes. From very
early in the revision process, the central purpose of the copyright law
was not only to benefit the public welfare, but also to "give authors the
reward due them for their contribution to society."' 51 While the legisla-
tive history of the 1909 Act reveals concern over whether the legislation
would "stimulate the producer and so benefit the public,"52 the Report
of the Register of Copyrights in 1961 suggested a subtle shift in the
focus to the creator:
While some limitations and conditions on copyright are
essential in the public interest, they should not be so burden-
49 Id.
50 Ringer, supra note 3, at 188.
51 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the purposes of
copyright law).
52 Id.
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some and strict as to deprive authors of their just reward.
. . . [The creators'] rights should be broad enough to give
them a fair share of the revenue to be derived from the mar-
ket for their works.5"
This new market approach is particularly relevant to the work-made-
for-hire provisions with regard to the treatment of commissioned works
in the 1976 Act.
54
"The status of works prepared on . . .commission was a major
issue in the development of the definition of 'works made for hire' in
section 101" of the 1976 Act.55 In a 1963 preliminary draft bill, the
Copyright Office defined "work made for hire" as "'a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of the duties of his employment, but
not including a work made on special order or commission.' ",5 Thus,
contrary to the case law interpreting the 1909 Act, no commissioned
works would have been deemed works made for hire. The complete
exclusion of commissioned works from the work-made-for-hire doc-
trine, however, was met with strong opposition on the part of book
publishers and motion picture producers.
These opponents of the exclusion of commissioned works from
work-made-for-hire treatment argued that "in the case of a wide range
of works . . . the distinction between 'employment' or 'commission' is
fundamentally meaningless, since in either case the work is prepared at
" Id. at 6.
" See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text (describing how the 1976 Act's
commissioned work-made-for-hire clauses have impeded the policy of providing fair
compensation to artists). The congressional interest in artists receiving fair compensa-
tion, however, has been diluted somewhat by the Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Court stated:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public pur-
pose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired.
"The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration .... It is said that reward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative
genius."
Id. at 429 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
Yet, even on the Supreme Court's terms, fair compensation to artists is one of the
factors necessary to provide the greatest possible benefit to the public.
55 H.R. REP'. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
6 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPPLEMENTARY RE-
PORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION pt. 6, at 66 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
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the employer's initiative and risk and under his direction, '57 echoing
Varmer's reasoning and the test adopted by the Scherr majority.58 On a
more practical level, they opposed the proposed change because, under
the Act's termination provisions, an individual author could terminate
her assignment after a period of years; the creator of a work made for
hire, however, could never terminate the employer's rights to the
work.59 Artists were equally opposed to "any broad provision that
would convert a commissioned work into a 'work made for hire' upon
the artist's written agreement," stressing their weak bargaining
positions."0
By 1965, a compromise had been reached-four categories of com-
missioned works could be considered works made for hire if the con-
tracting parties agreed to the same in writing."1 The Report from the
Register of Copyright made it clear, though, that "other works made on
special order or commission would not come within the definition" of a
work made for hire.6 2 By 1967, a further compromise had been
reached, and four additional categories were added to the list of those
commissioned works that could be considered as works made for hire
upon written agreement.6" The categories agreed upon by 1967 consti-
tute virtually all of the categories now in the 1976 Act.64 Both the Sen-
ate and House Reports on the final bill presented in 1976 stated: "The
definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in
effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that
can be considered 'works made for hire' under certain circum-
stances." 5 In short, from a preliminary draft that excluded all commis-
57 H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1967).
58 See supra note 47.
5 Section 203(a) provides, in part: "In the case of any work other than a work
made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright
... is subject to termination .... ." 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982). The publishers of a
work made for hire would retain copyright in the work for 75 years. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(c) (1982) (specifying statutory duration of copyright). Without the work-made-
for-hire provisions, an artist who assigned all her rights in the work could terminate
the assignment in 35 or 40 years, thus cutting the publisher's ownership time nearly in
half. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1982).
80 See H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 57, at 86; see also infra notes 139-53 and
accompanying text (describing the ability of large publishing houses to compel even
established independent artists to sign work-made-for-hire contracts).
61 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 56, at 67-68. The four designated
categories were contributions to collective works and motion pictures, translations, and
supplementary works.
62 Id.
11 See H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 57, at 87. The four additional categories
were compilations, instructional texts, tests, and atlases.
Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (enumerating types of commissioned works that
can be classified as works made for hire).
15 S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
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sioned works from the work-made-for-hire rubric, the copyright law
revision developed into a final bill wherein only certain, specified cate-
gories of commissioned works could be considered as works made for
hire. 6 Moreover, in those specific cases, the commissioned work could
only be a work made for hire if the parties agreed to designate it a
work made for hire in a writing signed by both parties.1
7
This was an unprecedented development in work-made-for-hire
doctrine. Prior to the 1976 Act, courts had simply lumped commis-
sioned works together with those created in an employment context in
making their work-made-for-hire decisions.6 In the 1976 Act, however,
Congress divided the work-made-for-hire doctrine between those works
"created within the scope of. . .employment" '69 and those works "spe-
cially ordered or commissioned. '70 Furthermore, the amount of deliber-
ation that went into enumerating which types of commissioned works
could be treated like employee-created works made for hire indicates
that Congress intended for there to be a meaningful distinction between
employee-created and commissioned works. As a result, while case law
relating to works made for hire in an employment context conceivably
could remain viable, the case law relating to commissioned works could
not.
71
The legislative history of the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire pro-
visions explicitly "adopt[ed] one of the basic principles of the [1909]
law: that in the case of works made for hire the employer is considered
the author of the work . ... ,"7' But the legislative history records no
other explicit incorporation of prior law relating to works made for
hire, legislative or court-made. While in a general revision statute, leg-
islative silence might well mean that court-made law is to continue in
force, in an Act conceived as a "radical ...departure"73 from prior
Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737
(emphasis added).
6 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, at § 5.03(B)(2)(a), at 5-18 to -20.
67 Id. at § 5.03(B)(2)(b), at 5-20 to -21.
66 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing courts' refusal to dis-
tinguish employee-created and commissioned works).
6- 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (subdivision (1) of "work-made-for-hire" definition).
70 Id. (subdivision (2) of "work-made-for-hire" definition).
71 See Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 43, at 230; see also id. at 236 ("[The
1976 Act] does not reflect the holding of [decisions such as Brattleboro Publishing Co.
v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966) (discussed supra notes 23-
25)], but instead wisely provides that only the specified works on commission may be
considered works made for hire, and then only by observing the prescribed
formalities.").
72 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5736.
73Ringer, supra note 3, at 188.
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law, the failure to explicitly incorporate prior case law is telling.
Where the 1976 Act incorporated prior case law, such was made clear
in the legislative history, for example: "There is no need for a specific
statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of the co-owners of
a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed. ' 74 Because
there was no explicit incorporation of prior case law concerning works
made for hire, the 1976 Act provided the basis for completely new judi-
cial treatment of commissioned works made for hire.
II. WORKS MADE FOR HIRE UNDER THE 1976 ACT
The 1976 Act defines a "work made for hire" in section 101 as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work,
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
as a translation,
as a supplementary work,
as a compilation,
as an instructional text,
as a test,
as answer material for a test,
or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed
by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire. 5
Section 201 defines ownership of copyright and explains how
works made for hire fit into the statutory scheme:
(a) Initial Ownership-Copyright in a work protected
under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the
work ....
(b) Works Made for Hire-In the case of a work made
for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work
• H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 72.
75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added). For the purposes of this Comment,
the first subdivision of the work-made-for-hire definition in § 101 is designated "subdi-
vision (1)" and the second subdivision is designated "subdivision (2)."
The term "collective work" includes magazines and newspapers, and thus subdivi-
sion (2) potentially affects a large number of artists and authors. See 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 21, at § 3.02, at 3-5 to -8.
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was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright."'
Subdivision (1) provides the exclusive definition for works made
for hire created by employees. So long as the creation falls within the
employee's "scope of employment," the work is automatically a work
made for hire."' Pursuant to section 201, therefore, the employer be-
comes the author of the work and retains the copyright.
It would also appear from both the legislative history78 and the
structure of the section itself that subdivision (2) is the exclusive cate-
gory for works created on commission by independent contractors.7 9
Subdivision (2) provides that works commissioned by a contracting
party can be considered works made for hire only if the works fall into
one of the specified categories and the parties have signed a contract
expressly designating the work as a work made for hire. 0 The initial
interpretations of the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire provisions con-
firmed this reading of subdivision (2), holding that, absent satisfaction
of both of the statutory prerequisites, a commissioned work was not a
work made for hire, thereby allowing independent artists to retain the
copyright in their works.81 Beginning with the 1984 decision in Aldon
Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel Inc.,82 however, the Second and Seventh
Circuits have embarked on a line of reasoning that threatens to under-
mine the legislative compromise represented by the 1976 Act's work-
made-for-hire provisions.
76 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
7 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982). See also Note, The Works Made for Hire Doctrine
Under the Copyright Act of 1976 - a Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v.
Spiegel Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 649, 655-56 (1986) (describing the 1976 Act's work-
made-for-hire provisions).
78 See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text (describing process of revision of
the Copyright Act).
79 See Gallay, Authorship and Copyright of "Works Made for Hire": Bugs in the
Statutory System, 8 ART & L. 573, 579 (1984) (maintaining that § 201(b) language
"or other person for whom the work is prepared" indicates congressional intent to treat
employees and independent contractors separately); Kadden, Recent Judicial Develop-
ments in the Copyright Law of the United States of America, 16 COPYRIGHT 217, 222-
23 (1980) ("[T]he 1976 Act's definition of a 'work made for hire' distinguishes sharply
between works prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment and works
specially ordered or commissioned.").
80 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982).
"' See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing cases). See also 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 21, at § 5.03(B)(2), at 5-19 to -21 (1986); Angel & Tannen-
baum, supra note 43, at 232 (discussing the 1976 Act's treatment of commissioned
works).
82 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
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A. Judicial Interpretation of the 1976 Provisions
The early cases applying the 1976 Act to works prepared by inde-
pendent contractors read subdivision (2) as the exclusive provision gov-
erning commissioned works. For example, the court in Meltzer v.
Zoller88 construed the 1976 commissioned work-made-for-hire provi-
sions as excluding the architectural drawings in question from work-
made-for-hire status.84 In Meltzer, a homeowner claimed authorship in
the architectural plans of his home. The court found that the home-
owner could not claim copyright in the plans, which were derived from
stock drawings and his suggestions, because they were not works made
for hire. The court excluded the plans from the work-made-for-hire
doctrine, because architectural plans do not fall into one of the enumer-
ated categories in section 101 and there was not the required express
written agreement between the homeowner and the architect denoting
the architectural plans as works made for hire. 5
8 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
The court's holding in Meltzer was in some ways foreshadowed by the decision
in May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980), in which
the Ninth Circuit, while deciding the case under the 1909 Act, indicated in dicta that,
under the 1976 Act, the architectural drawings in question "would not be subject to the
'works for hire' doctrine, both because of the absence of a written agreement so provid-
ing, and because the drawings do not fall within one of the prescribed categories of
work." May, 618 F.2d at 1368 n.4. See also Evert v. Arkham House Publishers, Inc.,
579 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (1909 Act applicable, but "if the 1976 statute was
applicable, the admitted lack of a written agreement between the parties and the type of
work involved here (a book of poetry . . .) would summarily dispose of [the pub-
lisher's] work-for-hire argument").
"B Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 855. The court explained its method of construction:
As a rule, '[a statutory] definition which declares what a term "means"
.. . excludes any meaning that is not stated.' . . . In this regard, it is a
well-known canon of construction that the language of the statute is the
best indication of legislative intent. Architectural drawings are not in-
cluded in the categories set forth in Section 101; and hence in accordance
with the above-stated principles, do not qualify as works made for hire
*. . . This is true even though the 1909 Act and certain common law
jurisdictions included architectural drawings within the rubric of works
made for hire, for it may be presumed that Congress was aware of the
prior construction of the terms in the original act, and deliberately limited
the scope of the new Act . ...
Id. (citations omitted). The most recent case recognizing Congress's intended dichotomy
between employee works and commissioned works is Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled
Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enter., No. 85-3741 (5th Cir. April 23, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("read § 101 as a reflection of a simple dichotomy
in fact between employees and independent contractors"); see also Whelan Assoc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (D.C. Pa. 1985) ("Under the
1976 Copyright Act the works for hire doctrine only applies to independent contractors
in certain limited circumstances defined by the Act."); Childers v. High Soc'y Maga-
zine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a commissioned work
cannot be a work made for hire in the absence of a written agreement designating it as
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The same reasoning was followed in Mister B Textiles, Inc. v.
Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc.88 In Mister B Textiles, the plaintiff sued for
copyright infringement of a fabric design. The plaintiff firm hired a
design company to create a new design for the firm's use. Thereafter,
plaintiff became aware of the defendant's alleged infringement of the
rights to the design. The plaintiff argued it held the copyright to the
design and, therefore, should prevail on the infringement claim, because
the design was a work for hire. The defendant responded that the de-
sign could not be a work made for hire, because fabric design was not
one of the enumerated categories of commissioned works eligible to be
works made for hire. 87 The court agreed with the defendant's interpre-
tation of the 1976 Act,"' but granted the plaintiff's claim to coyright on
joint copyright grounds. Because the plaintiff's employee had signifi-
cantly contributed to the creation of the design, she became one of the
joint owners of the work. 9 As an employee of the plaintiff, her rights
in the copyright passed to the plaintiff under the work-made-for-hire
provision regarding employees in subdivision (1).' 0
The reasoning employed by the courts in Meltzer and Mister B
Textiles to interpret the work-made-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act
provided no surprises. It was consonant with the legislative history of
the Act and its language." Two authors writing in 1976 were so confi-
dent in the clarity of the language and the legislative history of section
such); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252,
257 (D. Neb. 1982) (holding that § 101 limits commissioned works made for hire to
specific categories and those instances where there is an express agreement in writing).
88 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
87 Id. at 24.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 24-25 ("[Cloowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants
in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the work
.... ") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 72); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)
(1982) ("The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.").
90 Mister B Textiles, 523 F. Supp. at 25. Section 201 provides in part:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
91 See Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 43, at 231-32 (discussing the 1964 and
1965 proposed revisions in which the definitional structure of 'works made for hire'
that ultimately became § 101 was formulated); see also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630,
634 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to find that a series of articles revised for inclusion in a
collective work constituted work made for hire because the parties did not expressly
agree in a written statement that the work was to be a work made for hire).
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101 that they stated:
Section 101 . . . wisely defines which works on com-
mission may be considered works for hire . . . . [T]he new
definitions of works made for hire in sections 101 and 201
(b) will do much to narrow the possible areas of dispute and
provide guidelines which will enable third parties to more
easily ascertain who owns the rights in a given work for hire
or work on commission. 2
In 1984, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided a case that turned section 101 on its head. The court's interpre-
tation of section 101 in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,93 en-
larged the possible areas of dispute and made it much more difficult for
any party to be certain whether a particular work is a work made for
hire.
B. Aldon Accessories and its Progeny
1. The Aldon Acessories Decision
The reasoning in Aldon Accessories is problematic for independent
contractors who could, as a result of the court's opinion, have their
creations unwittingly classified as works made for hire, but the decision
is very much a product of the particular facts in that case. Aldon Acces-
sories Ltd. ("Aldon") designs and markets figurines and other decora-
tive pieces. One of its two principals, Arthur Ginsberg, in 1977 con-
ceived of a line of statuettes of mythical creatures, most notably a
unicorn and a Pegasus. After first working with a Japanese firm to
develop porcelain models of the statuettes,94 Ginsberg later conceived
the idea of marketing similar unicorns in brass and contacted a
Taiwanese firm to develop them. In the same way he had worked with
the Japanese artists, he worked with the Taiwanese artists to create
brass models of the unicorn. He filed a certificate of copyright registra-
tion for the brass unicorns, also designating Aldon as the author and
the works as works made for hire.95
" Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 43, at 239.
Is 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). The Second Circuit
has been referred to as the "de facto Copyright Court of the United States." Easter
Seals Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enter., No. 85-3741 (5th
Cir. Apr. 23, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
Id. at 549-50. At trial, Ginsberg testified that the artists, working under his
direct supervision, "spent hours and hours changing shapes, adjusting attitudes and
proportions until finally I thought there was a model that I liked." Id. at 550.
95 Id. at 550.
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Aldon advertised the brass unicorns and exhibited them at the
Chicago Gift Show in 1981. A buyer for Spiegel, Inc. ("Spiegel") ex-
amined the brass unicorn line for a half hour, after which the buyer
requested samples and took a catalog. The samples were sent. By mid-
1981, through its catalog, Spiegel was selling brass unicorns identical to
Aldon's statuette. Aldon sued Spiegel for copyright infringement.96
The primary factual dispute in Aldon Accessories centered on the
nature of the relationship between Aldon and the Taiwanese firm that
had developed Aldon's brass unicorns.9 To resolve this issue, the trial
court explored the nature and extent of Ginsberg's supervision, on be-
half of Aldon, of the Taiwanese firm. 8 In his instructions to the jury,
concerning Aldon's claim that the statuettes were works made for hire,
the trial judge gave the following charge:
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law
calls an employee working within the scope of his employ-
ment. What that means is, a person acting under the direc-
tion and supervision of the hiring author, at the hiring au-
thor's instance and expense. It does not matter whether the
for-hire creator is an employee in the sense of having a regu-
lar job with the hiring author. What matters is whether the
hiring author caused the work to be made and exercised the
right to direct and supervise the creation.99
The jury found that Spiegel had violated Aldon's copyright and
awarded more than $100,000 damages to Aldon.100
On appeal, Spiegel asserted that the jury instruction was clearly
erroneous, arguing that the jury charge, which predicated work-made-
for-hire status on the direction and supervision of the contractor, was a
restatement of the law under the 1909 Act, and was not an accurate
statement of the present state of the law. Under the 1976 Act, Spiegel
argued, the statuettes could not be works made for hire, because statu-
ary does not fall into one of the explicit categories listed in section 101
and because the parties signed no express written agreement designat-
ing the statuettes as works made for hire. 01
96 Id.
' Spiegel also contended in its defense that it had ordered its brass unicorns from
Taiwan before its buyer saw those of Aldon at the trade show. This factual issue was
resolved in Aldon's favor at trial. Id. at 551.
11 At trial, Ginsberg testified that the process through which the brass unicorns
was created was substantially similar to that followed in the production of the porcelain
unicorns. See supra note 94.
" Aldon Accesories, 738 F.2d at 551.
100 Id. at 549.
101 Id. at 551.
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In his opinion in Aldon Accessories, Judge Feinberg responded
that Spiegel was correct in its assertion that the statuettes could not be
works made for hire under subdivision (2) of the 1976 Act, but ob-
served that Spiegel gave an overly restrictive interpretation of subdivi-
sion (1), which governs works prepared by an employee within the
scope of her employment." 2 Judge Feinberg asserted that both subdivi-
sion (1) and subdivision (2) applied to independent contractors, but
subdivision (2) was drafted only for those instances "where the con-
tracting party did all of the creative work and the hiring party did little
or nothing."' ' Thus, subdivision (2) presented a special subcategory of
the general category of independent contractors. Under this reading of
the statute, the Taiwanese firm, acting under the instructions of Gins-
berg, could be considered an employee of Aldon, with the result that
the statuettes in question were works made for hire under subdivision
(1). The court based its argument almost entirely on legislative silence:
Nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indi-
cates that Congress intended to dispense with this prior law
. . . . Had Congress intended . . . to narrow the type of
employment relationships within the work for hire doctrine
to include only "regular" employees, it is unlikely that there
would have been no discussion of this change . ...
• . . But there is no indication in the legislative history
or elsewhere that Congress was focusing on contractors who
were actually sufficiently supervised and directed by the hir-
ing party . .. 10.
In an attempt to give some independent significance to the specific com-
missioned works provisions of subdivision (2), the court made its only
explicit reference to the 1976 Act's legislative history. Acknowledging
that Congress intended to change prior work-made-for-hire law relat-
ing to commissioned works, the court stated that the law under the
1909 Act was unsatisfactory, because it "frequently worked an injustice
in those situations where the contractor did all of the creative work and
the hiring party did little or nothing."' 0 5 The court asserted that subdi-
vision (2) was intended to correct "those situations."
Judge Feinberg's interpretation of the legislative history of the
1976 commissioned works provisions is highly dubious. To argue that
congressional silence entails the inclusion of prior law is compelling
102 Id. at 551-52.
10s Id. at 552.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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when the statute under consideration is one that merely revised or codi-
fied prior law.108 In the circumstances of the complete overhaul of the
copyright law found in the 1976 Act, however, that argument from si-
lence is much less convincing."0 7 Furthermore, to argue that subdivision
(2) covers only a subcategory of all possible independent contractors is
to ignore the legislative development of that clause. The preliminary
draft of the 1976 Act excluded all independent contractors from opera-
tion of the work-made-for-hire rules. l08 Only after debate and compro-
mise were certain, specific types of independent contractors included in
the legislation.109
Ironically, the one legislative source that is cited in Aldon Accesso-
ries contains language that refutes Judge Feinberg's argument.
Describing the commissioned-works provision in what became the 1976
Act, the House Report cited in Aldon Accessories commented: "The
definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in
effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that
can be considered 'works made for hire' under certain circum-
stances."110 Neither the history of the evolution of the 1976 commis-
sioned work-made-for-hire clause nor the House Report to which the
court referred justified the court's assumption that subdivision (1) could
encompass all commissioned works made for hire except those listed in
subdivision (2).
It should be noted that Judge Feinberg found himself in a difficult
situation in Aldon Accessories. It had already been resolved at trial that
Spiegel did in fact copy Aldon's Taiwanese unicorns. I Owing to defi-
ciencies in Taiwanese copyright law, however, Aldon was the only
party in a position to challenge Spiegel's behavior. 12 Furthermore, it
100 1A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.27, at 254-
55 (rev. ed. 1985).
107 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
'08 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
I10 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (describing formulation of the
1976 Act's commissioned works provisions).
"1 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in, 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
m Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 549.
1 While the reasoning adopted by Judge Feinberg had in fact been advanced
previously, see O'Meara, "Works Made for Hire" Under the Copyright Act of
1976-Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523 (1982), it has been sug-
gested that Judge Feinberg's opinion was also motivated by practical considerations.
See Goldberg & Ginsburg, Judicial Developments in the United States Copyright Law,
123 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 3, 33 (1985) ("Because many of
the Far Eastern countries in which American companies commission the creation of
dolls, toys, decorative artworks, and similar works ...are neither signatories to a
bilateral copyright treaty with the U.S., nor to a multilateral copyright treaty to which
the U.S. is a party, the resulting works, if published, will not be protected in the U.S.
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was clear that the brass unicorns could not be considered works made
for hire under subdivision (2). Therefore, although the equities of the
case tipped in favor of Aldon, the court was forced to search for a legal
ground to hold in Aldon's favor.
The court met this difficulty by interpreting subdivision (1) in a
manner that, contrary to the language and legislative history of the stat-
ute, allowed independent contractors to be considered employees for the
purpose of work-made-for-hire analysis. Although he reached an equi-
table result, Judge Feinberg overlooked a manner of resolving the case
in Aldon's favor on less strained statutory grounds. Based on the find-
ings of the trial court, Ginsberg played a very active role in the devel-
opment of the brass unicorns."' If so, a strong argument could be made
that Ginsberg was a joint owner of the copyright." 4 Since Ginsberg
was a principal/employee of Aldon, and developing the statuettes was
within the scope of his duties," 5 his joint ownership rights in the statu-
ettes should have passed to Aldon under subdivision (1), thus allowing
Aldon to maintain its suit against Spiegel."' This resolution of the case
would be in accord with the reasoning in Mister B Textiles v. Wood-
crest Fabrics,1 7 where the court found that if the employee of a com-
pany contributed significantly to the creation of the work, then the
company was joint owner of the copyright under subdivision (1).118
unless the commissioning company is deemed the 'author', [sic] or unless the works are
first publicly distributed in the U.S. or in a treaty country."); cf Cooling Systems and
Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the nationality of work made for hire of nondramatic literary material produced by
non-domiciliary resides in employer).
1I See supra note 94 and accompanying text. There is reason to believe, however,
that Ginsberg's input was not as extensive as one might think from reading the circuit
court's opinion. See FitzGibbon & Kendall, The Unicorn in the Courtroom: The Con-
cept of "Supervising and Directing" an Artistic Creation is a Mythical Beast in the
Copyright Law, 15 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 23, 27-29 (1985) (counsel for Spiegel sug-
gesting that Ginsberg's creative input and supervision were minimal).
114 It is possible that the Aldon Accessories court did not decide the case on joint
authorship grounds because it was uncertain whether the record warranted a finding
that Ginsberg was in fact a joint author. See supra note 113. However, it seems more
likely that the court, by adopting reasoning similar to that of Justice Friendly in his
dissent in Scherr, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text, lost sight of the dis-
tinction between work-made-for-hire and joint ownership analysis. The court's misin-
terpretation of the legislative history of subdivision (2) also involved a blurring of the
line between joint ownership and work made for hire. See supra note 105 and accom-
panying text.
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Ginsberg was in charge of the production and
creative aspects of the business. Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 549.
"Ii See Certiorari Brief for Petitioners at 14, Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc., 469 U.S. 982 (1984) (denying certiorari) (arguing that correct result of Aldon
Accessories would have been finding that Ginsberg was a joint author).
117 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
118 Id. at 24-25. One difficulty for the artist in making the commissioning party
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Standing alone, Aldon Accessories could be dismissed as an exam-
ple of an appellate court reaching an equitable result by the easiest
available reasoning, and its potential to upset the legislative compro-
mise concerning commissioned works could be ignored. Unfortunately,
if the recent Seventh Circuit opinion in Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago
Systems Software"'9 is any indication, the reasoning in Aldon Accesso-
ries is developing a life of its own independent of the peculiar facts that
gave rise to the Second Circuit's decision.
2. Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software
In Evans Newton, the plaintiff, Evans Newton Incorporated
("ENI") was a corporation providing recordkeeping systems to schools.
In 1979, ENI decided to develop management software, and entered
into an agreement with Chicago Systems Software ("CSS") to develop
the programming. Following CSS's demonstration of the program,
CSS's president signed an "ENI Microcomputer Program Copyright
Statement," which stated that CSS recognized ENI's "exclusive prop-
erty" rights in the program and that CSS "agree[d] not to sell, trade,
give, or intentionally make available programs written for
ENI. .. .""o Subsequent to the signing of this agreement, however,
CSS began to market a competing program and user's manual, which
were materially similar to the program it had prepared for ENI. The
district court found that CSS's program was a work made for hire and
that CSS was guilty of copyright infringement, levying an injunction
and assessing damages.
121
On appeal, CSS argued that its work could not be a work made
for hire under the 1976 Act, because no signed, written agreement
joint owner with the artist lies in the fact that the artist then could not terminate the
commissioner's ownership. However, the joint owner does have the right to his share of
the profits, so that joint ownership is better economically than work-made-for-hire sta-
tus. See Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Miller Music, Inc., 272 A.D. 571, 574-75, 74
N.Y.S.2d 425, 427-28 (1947), affd, 299 N.Y. 782 (1949) (co-owners of joint copyright
are accountable to each other).
There are two other ways one might think of the Aldon facts. First, one might
argue that Ginsberg/Aldon were sole authors of the piece in the same way a poet is
author of a poem that she dictates to a stenographer. Second, one could argue that the
brass works were derivative of the porcelain works made with the Japanese artists in
1977. Since the 1976 Act did not go into effect until 1978, the decision would have been
decided under the 1909 Act, assuming that United States law would have been applica-
ble rather than Japanese. Under the later interpretation of the 1909 Act, the Japanese
artists would have created works made for hire and Aldon would have been the author
of the original and the derivative works.
119 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986).
120 Id. at 892 n.3.
121 Id. at 893.
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designating the program as a work made for hire existed and because
computer programs did not fall under the enumerated categories in
subdivision (2). CSS claimed, instead, that it was a co-owner with
ENI.' 22 Furthermore, it argued that since the district court had found
that 0SS was an "independent contractor" and thus outside the scope
of subdivision (2), its work could not be a work made for hire.
Relying on Aldon Accessories, Judge Harlington Wood rejected
GSS's framing of the issue:
[T]he proper issue was not . . . whether the defendant
was an employee or an independent contractor, but rather
'[was] the contractor "independent" or [was] the contractor
so controlled and supervised in the creation of the particular
work by the employing party that an employer-employee re-
lationship exist[ed]." 23
The court followed the Aldon Accessories decision, because it be-
lieved that the Aldon Accessories court "carefully considered the legis-
lative history of 17 U.S.C. § 101. ' 1124 As has already been asserted, this
assumption is highly questionable. 125 While, as in Aldon Accessories,
Evans Newton involved an appellate court affirmance of a decision that
could be supported on other grounds,1 26 the ease with which the rea-
soning in Aldon Accessories was accepted is troubling.
3. Consequences of the Adoption of the Aldon Accessories
Reasoning
What is the likely result of widespread use of the Aldon Accesso-
ries court's reasoning in work-made-for-hire cases? As Evans Newton
suggests, such reasoning leaves the door open for hiring parties, who
have failed to get a full assignment of copyright rights from indepen-
dent contractors falling outside the subdivision (2) guidelines, to unilat-
erally obtain work-made-for-hire rights years after the work has been
completed as long as they directed or supervised the work, a standard
that is hard not to meet when one is a hiring party. Not only would
122 Id.
123 Id. at 894 (quoting Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 552); see also Marshall v.
Miles Laboratories, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("critical question
was whether the employer caused the work to be made and exercised the right to direct
and supervise the creation").
124 Evans Newton, 793 F. 2d at 894.
125 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
128 Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 893 n.4 (holding in the alternative that CSS's
marketing of its materially similar program could be enjoined on the grounds that OSS
had breached its confidentiality agreement with ENI).
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adopting such a standard frustrate the intent of the drafters of the 1976
Act that certain independent contractors never fall under the work-
made-for-hire doctrine 2' and should retain their copyright rights un-
less and until they had assigned such rights to third parties, but it also
would remove the certainty with which all parties could know the sta-
tus of a work created by an independent contractor under the 1976 Act.
The Aldon Accessories reasoning in effect puts the independent con-
tractor in nearly as bad a position as she was under the pre-1976 law
when her works were presumed to be works made for hire. She can
never be certain whether she will continue to be able to maintain her
copyright rights.12 Furthermore, since her rights in the artwork are
not definitely hers, she is likely to receive less if she tries to alienate
those rights than she would have received had she had absolute rights
in the work.
Moreover, since the focus of the inquiry has shifted from whether
an artist is classified as an independent contractor or an employee to
the issue of whether the employer has a right to supervise, theoretically,
a court could apply subdivision (1) to those types of contractors specifi-
cally enumerated in subdivision (2), thereby gutting the requirement of
a written, signed agreement designating those types of independent con-
tractors' works as works made for hire. Taken to its logical conclusion,
application of the Aldon Accessories adoption of the Scherr majority's
right to supervision test129 erases twenty years of carefully crafted com-
promises. Subdivision (2) becomes superfluous and many more works
become works made for hire than Congress intended.
127 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
128 This loss in certainty is even more pronounced once one examines the decisions
applying the Aldon Accessories reasoning and supervision test. See Iris Arc v. S.S.
Sarna, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 916, 919-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the fact design
had to meet with hiring party's approval is sufficient to designate the design as a work
made for hire under subdivision (1)); Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 616
F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that photographer's deference to royal
family does not render photographs works made for hire).
One district court decision decided before Aldon Accessories also implicitly fol-
lowed the same reasoning. Town of Glarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (without reference to § 101 provisions, "parties agree that resolution
of the issue of Clarkstown's supervision and control over the Manual is tantamount to
a ruling on the preliminary injunction"); see also Sykee v. Roulo, 122 Ill. App. 3d 331,
334, 461 N.E.2d 480, 483 (1984) ("crucial question is if plaintiff had the right to
control the work").
129 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in
Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
936 (1970)). For an example of a court taking the right to supervision test to its ex-
treme, see CCNV v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.D.C. 1987) ("If the putative
'employee' . . . possessed the right to 'direct and supervise' the manner in which the
work was done, the copyright is his no matter the degree of creative license actually
exercised by the artist-employee.").
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The Aldon Accessories reasoning could also open another Pan-
dora's box. In addition to discussing the hiring party's right to super-
vise, the court emphasized the amount of supervision and direction
Ginsberg supplied, echoing Judge Friendly's criterion for works made
for hire in his Scherr dissent. The court stated that Ginsberg "was, in a
very real sense, the artistic creator.''130 If the standard under subdivi-
sion (1) is whether the employer made a significant artistic contribu-
tion, then many employee works could not be works made for hire and
the majority of commissioned works would not be works made for hire.
Thus, many fewer works could be designated as works made for hire
than Congress intended. Hence, if the Aldon Accessories decision is un-
derstood as the an example of the doctrine asserted by Judge Friendly,
all work-made-for-hire issues could become issues of joint ownership
and relative rights, and both subdivisions (1) and (2) would become
superfluous. Whether courts interpret the supervision test in Aldon Ac-
cessories as that introduced by the majority or the dissent in Scherr, the
result misses the mark intended to be reached by Congress.
III. THE 1976 WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE PROVISIONS ARE IN
NEED OF REFORM
The deleterious consequences of widespread application of the Al-
don Accessories reasoning cannot be fully appreciated without some in-
sight into the practical operation of the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire
provisions. Aldon Accessories makes it possible for commissioned works
to be classified as employee works made for hire; the decade of experi-
ence under the 1976 Act has demonstrated two other unfortunate
trends. The first is that almost any work capable of contractual catego-
rization as a work made for hire will in fact become a work made for
hire. The second is that, under the 1976 Act, the author of a work
made for hire is almost certain to be undercompensated for the full
value of her work, owing to the artists' inferior bargaining power. This
part of the Comment explores the deficiencies of the 1976 Act's work-
made-for-hire provisions and suggests amendments that will restore the
Act's originally intended balance between the interests of the creators
and the purchasers of commissioned works.
A. The Current Commissioned Work-Made-for-Hire Provisions
Fail to Promote the Policies of Copyright Law
The policies intended to be furthered by the revision of copyright
10 Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 553.
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law can best be described by two passages from one of the early reports
on the revision:
While some limitations and conditions on copyright are
essential in the public interest, they should not be so burden-
some and strict as to deprive authors of their just reward.
. . . [Tlheir rights should be broad enough to give them a
fair share of the revenue to be derived from the market for
their works.
The primary purpose of copyright is to stimulate the
creation and dissemination of intellectual works, thus ad-
vancing "the progress of science and useful arts." The grant
of exclusive rights of authors is a means of achieving this
end, and of compensating authors for their labors and their
contributions to society. 31
Thus, the 1976 Act was intended to accomplish three goals: the stimu-
lation of creation, the dissemination of creative works, and the fair com-
pensation of authors for their contributions. The operation of the Act's
commissioned work-made-for-hire clauses has established an impedi-
ment to all three goals.
Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi has proposed legislative
amendments to the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire provisions in
1982,132 1983,33 and 1986.134 Only the 1982 bill made it far enough to
merit hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary;135 those hearings
are very instructive of how the 1976 Act was working after four years
in operation.
Senate Bill 2044, introduced in 1982, sought to eliminate the fol-
131 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 9, at 6.
132 S. 2044, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 649 (1982).
133 S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The proposal was also submitted in the
House by Rep. Barney Frank. H.R. 5911, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
134 S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S4494 (daily ed. Apr. 17,
1986). Senator Cochran intends to file legislation similar to S. 2330 in 1987. Telephone
interview with Ms. Linda Slade, Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator Thad Cochran
(March 31, 1986).
1"I Definition of Work Made for Hire in the Copyright Act of 1976: Hearing on
S. 2044 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Hearing]. In 1986, the Senate Judiciary Committee did not hear S. 2330 and thus
the bill died in committee in part because the Judiciary Committee was conducting
impeachment hearings regarding Judge Harry E. Claiborne, and tax reform was at a
fever pitch. Telephone interview with Ms. Linda Slade, Legislative Assistant to Senator
Thad Cochran (January 29, 1987). In such an atmosphere, copyright revision becomes
relegated to being an "after dinner mint" on the "banquet table" of legislation. Tele-
phone interview with Ms. Margi Trapani, Graphic Artists Guild (Jan. 29, 1987)
(quoting discussion between Graphic Artists Guild representatives and legislative aide).
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lowing categories from the list of types of commissioned works found in
subdivision (2): contributions to collective works, works part of motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, and instructional texts.136 Exclu-
sion of the category of contributions to collective works potentially af-
fected both publishers and anyone who submitted work to magazines,
including writers, photographers, and graphic artists. Those groups
provided the bulk of the testimony.
During the 1982 hearings on Senate bill 2044, The Association of
American Publishers stated most succinctly the view all the other pub-
lishers' groups espoused, that the 1976 Act's provisions for commis-
sioned works made for hire were a "balanced, workable, and fair reso-
lution" in no need of revision. 3 7 This was the compromise for which
they had hoped. The Magazine Publishers Association went so far as to
say that the 1976 "statutory provisions for work made for hire. . . are
incapable of becoming a mechanism for oppressing individual contribu-
tors."'3 8 The stories told by the authors and other artists testifying indi-
cated otherwise.
1. Fair Compensation for Artists
Just as the artists had feared in debates over the drafting of the
1976 Act,'3 9 the requirement of a written contract merely opened the
way for the exploitation of their works. Due to the parties' unequal
bargaining power,'40 when writing for publishing houses, authors fre-
quently found themselves in the position of having only two choices:
either submit work as work made for hire or do not submit work at
138 See S. 2044, supra note 132, at 292.
187 Hearing, supra note 135, at 71 (statement of the Ass'n of American Publish-
ers). Even though artists were complaining bitterly about the operation of the 1976
work-made-for-hire provisions, publishers argued that they deserved the authorial sta-
tus granted by work-made-for-hire contracts, because they made substantial investment
of time, skills, and money in the works. Id. at 70-71.
13 Id. at 58 (statement of Mr. E. Gabriel Perle on behalf of the Magazine Pub-
lishers Ass'n).
139 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
140 See Note, Blanket Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and Encourage-
ment of Artistic Endeavor, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 1245, 1254 n.57 (1983) ("An artist's
total dependence on the publisher to reach the public explains [the leverage a publisher
has over an artist]."). One commentator has responded to the unequal bargaining
power between contracting parties and independent contractors by arguing that
"[fireelance authors ...ought to lose their fictitious status as entrepreneurs and
should come to be viewed, for purposes of social insurance, tax and antitrust law in
particular, as that which they really are, the quasi-employees of quasi-employers, usu-
ally the media." Cohen Jehoram, The Author's Place in Society and Legal Relations
Between Authors and Those Responsible for Distributing Their Works, 14 Copy-
RIGHT 385, 385 (1978).
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all. 41 As a result, work-made-for-hire clauses have become the norm in
magazine publishing contracts."" During the hearings on Senate bill
2044, the Magazine Publishers Association denied that authors were in
weaker bargaining positions than publishers. The Association argued
that "the writers assigned or commissioned to write articles for recog-
nized magazines are almost invariably part of a comparatively small
group of well-known freelancers who have and exercise bargaining
power on an equal level with that of the editor or publisher." 43 The
Association's reservation of equal bargaining power to the well-known
artists is telling, since it amounts to an admission that less well-known
artists are indeed at the mercy of the publisher. In addition, there is
reason to believe that the Association's characterization of the bargain-
ing power of established free-lance artists was less than forthright. As
one graphic artist, who frequently prepares illustrations for major pub-
lishing houses, noted: "The great majority of artists are not stars. The
fact that James Michener can negotiate any contract that he wants is
not only debatable but also irrelevant to the problems faced by profes-
sionals at all levels. ' 14 4 Elmer Bernstein, representing the Screen Com-
posers of America, also refuted the notion that work-made-for-hire
abuses were only relevant to the unknown or beginning author. Mr.
Bernstein testified that he is "considered to be probably one of the top
composers in [his] field" and that he "command[s] probably the highest
fees that are paid to composers today. 1 145 Yet, he stated that if he re-
fused to work unless there were no work-made-for-hire clause in his
contract, he "would have to consider some other field of work. 1 46
141 See Hearing, supra note 135, at 132-33 (statement of Mr. Robert G. Steele,
illustrator); see also Comment, Free Lance Artists, Works Made for Hire, and the
Copyright Act of 1976, U.C. DAVis L. REV. 703, 705 n.7 (1982) ("[T]he use of work
for hire contracts has increased due to the provisions of the new law.").
142 See Hearing, supra note 135, at 10 (testimony of Mr. Irwin Karp on behalf of
the Author's League of America).
141 Id. at 59 (statement of Mr. E. Gabriel Perle on behalf of the Magazine Pub-
lishers Ass'n).
144 Id. at 34 (statement of Ms. Robin Brickman, a member of the Graphic Artists'
Guild, who has prepared graphics for Doubleday, Houghton Mifflin, the New Yorker,
Horticulture Magazine, Rodale Books, the New York Times, and Little Brown, Inc.).
'45 Id. at 73 (testimony of Mr. Elmer Bernstein on behalf of the Screen Compos-
ers of America).
148 Id. at 73. Mr. E. Gabriel Perle, representing the Magazine Publishers Associ-
ation, disputed the pervasiveness of work-made-for-hire contracts, arguing that "maga-
zine publishers rarely use the work made for hire approach. They do not very often
need those rights. And they do not need the hassle that is involved in negotiating for
more than they need or want." Id. at 50. Ms. June Roth, president of the American
Society of Journalists and Authors, contended, however, that purchase of one-time,
North American rights had been the usual practice, but that publishers were changing
over to work-made-for-hire contracts with all of their concomitant inequities. Id. at 4-
5.
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The signing of a work-made-for-hire clause designates the pub-
lisher as the "author" for purposes of copyright.1 47 Once the publisher
becomes the author, she can use the work any way she pleases,"4" even
in ways unanticipated by the artist at the time of the agreement. This
allows publishers to further undermine the already tenuous bargaining
position of independent artists. For example, Ms. Robin Brickman, a
graphic artist, testified that she was commissioned to do interior graph-
ics for a book for Doubleday Books and was told she would either take
the work-made-for-hire contract or receive no commission at all. Ms.
Brickman accepted the contract after agreeing on the price for the inte-
rior graphics and produced and delivered them. Later, Ms. Brickman
discovered one of her graphics was used for the cover of the book.14 9
Had she known the publisher intended to make such use of her work,
she could have bargained for greater remuneration.' The use of the
work-made-for-hire contract allowed Doubleday to get the cover illus-
tration, which would usually cost between $500 and $800, for the $75
paid for the interior graphic.' 5 ' In addition, Ms. Brickman was dis-
pleased with the way the cover illustration was colored by the pub-
lisher.'5 Had she not been forced to acquiesce to a work-made-for-hire
contract for the interior graphics and been able to negotiate about the
individual cover graphic separately, she might have been able to retain
some minimal artistic control over the coloring, or been able to bargain
for compensation for relinquishing such control. The work-made-for-
hire contract, however, precluded her from ever getting to the bargain-
ing table on such issues.The Joint Ethics Committee, an organization
of illustrators, painters, art directors, graphic artists, photographers,
and their agents, submitted a statement that, in increasing instances,
the imposition of a work-made-for-hire contract on the artist is done
after the assignment has been started.' 53 Such a use puts the artist in
"4 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (subdivision (1)).
148 It also deprives the author of re-use rights. The Association of American Pub-
lishers has no sympathy for that position, saying that it is false that artists need re-use
rights to stay in business. Rather, according to the Publishers, an artist can simply "use
... her talents to create other works." Ass'n of American Publishers, Inc., Position
Paper 4 (July 1986) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Their
response, obviously, does not meet the artists' critique.
149 See Hearing, supra note 135, at 3 (testimony of Ms. Robin Brickman).
1. The Society of Photographer and Artist Representatives, Inc., submitted a
statement to the same effect: photographers were being required to sell all rights at one-
time prices without the benefit of any negotiation. Id. at 107-08 (statement of Ms.
Edith Leonian, Chairperson, Copyright and Industry Practices Committees, Society of
Photographer and Artist Representatives, Inc.).
11 Id. at 3 (testimony of Ms. Robin Brickman).
182 Id.
13 Id. at 153 (statement of the Joint Ethics Committee).
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even less of a position to be able to turn down the work-made-for-hire
conditions: time, effort, and money are already expended. The unequal
bargaining position of the parties, the unqualified nature of the transfer
of the rights, and the commissioning party's ability to dictate if and
when work-made-for-hire contracts will be imposed on the artist all
combine to deprive freelance artists of fair compensation for their
works.
2. Incentives to Produce Creative Works
The operation of the 1976 Act's commissioned work-made-for-hire
provisions also threatens artistic production by creating inducements for
authors to produce less than their highest quality work. The San Fran-
cisco Society of Illustrators submitted a letter in the 1982 hearings in
which it stated that "an artist can, and has, found that a piece origi-
nally commissioned (and priced) as a minor work has been extensively
used as a major visual ie [sic]: book cover, billboard. ' 154 The Society
echoed other artists' concern with failing to receive proper remunera-
tion, but also stressed that such practices penalized the artist for "doing
work beyond the expectations of the artbuyer."' 55 Therefore, the 1976
Act creates a powerful incentive to artists to produce the absolute mini-
mum work required by the commissioning party.
This sentiment was echoed by June Roth, president of the Ameri-
can Society of Journalists and Authors, when she wrote that the
mandatory work-made-for-hire contracts permitted by the 1976 Act's
provisions created the risk of "losing a healthy flow of superior profes-
sional material" with a "sharp and inevitable decline in editorial qual-
ity."1 56 In 1983, a commentator focusing on journalists expressed the
same sentiment: "[Sluch further 'insults' as work-for-hire abuses might
drive the most intellectually gifted of them into such higher-paying ver-
bally-oriented fields as law and public relations.1157 Reducing the qual-
ity and quantity of artistic works and the quantity of the "most intellec-
tually gifted" authors contravenes both the declared intent of the 1976
Act' and the constitutional imperative to benefit the public.159
14 Id. at 130 (letter of Mr. John A. Lytle, President, San Francisco Society of
Illustrators).
155 Id.
158 Id. at 22 (statement of Ms. June Roth, president, American Society of Jour-
nalists and Authors, Inc. (citing AMERICAN SOCIETY OF JOURNALISTS AND AUTHORS,
On 'Work Made for Hire': A Statement of Position, 1 (Apr. 28, 1978))).
157 Note, Journalists' Rights to Their Own Work, 8 ART & L. 113, 123 (1983).
158 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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3. Dissemination of Works
Finally, the 1976 provisions provide a bar to the greatest possible
dissemination of artistic works. The ease with which publishers can
obtain all future rights in works with work-made-for-hire contracts
provides an incentive to secure all those rights, whether they ever in-
tend to reuse the works or not. Once they have purchased a work at
one-time rates, and used it, they have no particular motivation to ex-
ploit all of the possible uses of the work. In fact, they are more than
likely not geared to make profitable use of all the rights they do obtain.
The 1976 work-made-for-hire provisions governing commissioned
works, thus, keep re-use rights in works from being exploited by those
who would push hardest to distribute their works in as many forms as
possible: the artists.
Twenty years of apparent compromise resulted in a provision that
has harmed both artists and the public welfare. As Philip Leonian, a
free-lance photographer, stated, a "compromise is all too often a tempo-
rary solution."' 6° In this case, the compromise was a temporary solu-
tion to the theoretical disagreements between legislative drafters, but a
positive producer of inequality in practice. The response by many art-
ists has been to join together to push for legislative reform. By 1986,
more than forty artist and writer groups representing more than forty
thousand artists had coalesced to support reform of the 1976 Act's
work-made-for-hire provisions.1"'
B. Legislative Proposals to Change the Work-Made-for-Hire
Provisions
For the past five years, various amendments to the 1976 Act have been
proposed that would lessen the disparity in bargaining power between
artists and publishers. These reforms would provide greater compensa-
tion for commissioned artists, thereby increasing the quality and quan-
tity of artistic creation in the United States. The following discussion
highlights some of the ways in which amendments to the provisions
governing works made for hire could further the policies intended to be
protected by copyright legislation.
160 See Hearing, supra note 135, at 158 (statement of Mr. Philip Leonian, free-
lance photographer).
161 S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S4483 (daily ed. Apr. 17,
1986). Grassroots coalitions of artists have led the lobby for legislative change. Artists
have gone to Washington to lobby in person and instituted letter-writing campaigns.
Telephone interview with Ms. Margi Trapani, Graphic Artists Guild (Nov. 21, 1986).
The growth of the grtists' guilds has been attributed to the work-made-for-hire contro-
versy. See Hearing, supra note 135, at 34 (testimony of Ms. Robin Brickman).
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1. Preventing the Aldon Accessories Outcome
In light of the potential for inequitable treatment that exists when-
ever a commissioned work is considered a work made for hire, Con-
gress should take steps to limit the application of the work-made-for-
hire provisions to the circumstances originally envisioned in the 1976
Act. The first step in any reform of the work-made-for-hire provisions,
therefore, would be to amend the Act in a manner that would, in effect,
overrule the interpretation of the work-made-for-hire definition in sec-
tion 101 that has been adopted in cases such as Aldon Accessories."6 2
Congress is, in large part, responsible for this misinterpretation of the
work-made-for-hire provisions. In both the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act,
it refused to provide a guiding definition of "employee" or "employer,"
thus leaving courts with unfettered discretion to determine the opera-
tion of the work-made-for-hire provisions. This failure, noted in the
legislative history of the 1909 Act,163 must be remedied if the intent of
the drafters of section 101 is to be effected.
One proposed remedy of Congress's omission is to borrow a defini-
tion of "employee" from another statute. For instance, an "employee"
could be defined as one who receives employment benefits required by
law and whose employer withholds taxes from salary.'" With such a
qualifying definition, the Aldon Accessories court's transformation of
works by types of independent contractors not listed in subdivision (2)
into subdivision (1) "employee" works would not be possible. Without
such a definition, efforts by artists to have types of commissioned works
deleted from subdivision (2) are essentially pointless;16 5 as long as the
Aldon Accessories interpretation is possible under the language of the
Act, removal of types of works from subdivision (2) will not prevent
those works from being designated as works made for hire. Insertion of
a definition of "employee" is a prerequisite to redefining the scope of
subdivision (2).
2. Unfair Compensation and Unequal Bargaining Power
Providing a definition of "employee" will only limit the number of
artists potentially subject to having their works classified as works
162 See supra notes 93-130 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
163 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164 Such a provision was proposed in S. 2330, supra note 134, at § I(A) and S.
2138, supra note 133, at § 2(1).
' Such efforts are a major part of many copyright reforms. See, e.g., S. 2330,
supra note 134, at § I(B); S. 2138, supra note 133, at § 1; and S. 2044, supra note
132, at §§ 1-3.
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made for hire; for those independent contractors whose work product
still comes within the scope of subdivision (2), additional reforms are
needed. The most straightforward reform would be to delete subdivi-
sion (2)166 in addition to providing a definition of "employee." There-
fore, no commissioned works would be works made for hire. One com-
mentator has argued that this would "arm the author with the
copyright as he went into the negotiating room. . . .[and] at least sub-
ject [the publisher's] superior bargaining power to more challenges.
'
1
1 7
Theoretically, then, artists might be afforded some protection from
publishers bargaining for an avowed purpose of the artwork and then
using the work for another purpose, assuming that bargaining for indi-
vidual rights would entail bargaining for particular uses. Such a propo-
sal, however, would not prevent publishing houses from extracting all-
rights contracts from the authors. Because publishers are in a superior
bargaining position, as long as artists can contract their rights away,
publishers will be able retain the upper hand in all contract negotia-
tions.168 There is no reason to believe that they will bargain any more
explicitly for individual rights under an all-rights contract than they
have under work-made-for-hire contracts.
To remedy this type of injustice, deletion of subdivision (2) would
have to be coupled with a requirement that contracts explicitly state the
publisher's intended uses of the work,"6 9 and/or that transfers of rights
..6 Deletion of all commissioned work categories except for motion pictures was
proposed in S. 2330, supra note 134, at § 1(B). For discussion of why other proposals
have continued special treatment for motion pictures, see Colby, Copyright Revision
Revisited: Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the United States
Copyright Act, 5 WHrIER L. REV. 491 (1983) (defense of work made for hire in
movie-making industry by Senior Distribution & Marketing Counsel of Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corporation); Fischer, Work Made for Hire Revisited, 5 Copy-
RIGHT MGMT., Apr. 1982, at 4-5 (1981) ("In motion pictures there are many possible
creators of works of authorship-screenwriters, directors, cinematographers, actors, and
others. Work made for hire is a valuable means of synchronizing these possible claim-
ants under one copyright scheme.").
France has chosen an approach to audiovisual works that falls halfway between
the work-made-for-hire approach and the laissez-faire contractual approach. New
French law "decrees in behalf of the producer of an audiovisual work a presumption of
transfer by authors of their exclusive exploitation rights in the work concerned." Fran-
gon, The Audiovisual Production Contract, 127 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR 70, 76 (1986). Thus, absent contrary contractual provisions, French courts
will presume transfer of rights in an audiovisual work from the artist to the commis-
sioning party. The law, however, in an attempt to protect authors' interests, delineates
the amount to be paid to authors and who should pay authors. See id. at 84-92. The
law also requires producers to provide accounting to authors. Id. at 92. Whether this
law "strike[s] a balance between the opposing interests of producers and artists" as
hoped is yet to be seen. Id. at 100.
167 Note, supra note 157, at 123.
168 See Hearing, supra note 135, at 10 (testimony of Mr. Irwin Karp).
169 Senate bill 2138, for example, proposed that, for works of the type that bill
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are deemed not to exceed the parties' reasonable expectations of use.170
Under such a requirement, for example, Ms. Brickman's transfer of the
right to use her graphics as internal graphics could not have rightfully
been parlayed into transfer of the right to use them on the cover.171
Therefore, Doubleday's use would have constituted infringement, and
Ms. Brickman would have been entitled to sue to recover the compen-
sation wrongfully deprived her.
What would these reforms achieve for artists? Besides providing
the artists with more opportunities to bargain and more information
with which to bargain, it would provide them with the ability to termi-
nate their grant of copyright pursuant to section 203.172 As long as
their works are designated as works made for hire, artists can never
regain rights to their works. If their works are not works made for hire,
however, authors could terminate the hiring parties' rights after thirty-
five or forty years. The right to termination would provide authors
with a right to exploit, and thereby earn compensation from, works for
which they received the equivalent of one-time use rates and which
then had unexpectedly prolonged vitality.
173
proposed to delete from subdivision (2), transfer of rights could only occur in a "written
instrument [signed by both parties] specifically enumerating each right." S. 2138, supra
note 133, at § 2(2). Cf.Frangon, supra note 166, at 80 (French audiovisual law speci-
fies that "audiovisual production contracts shall not imply assignment to the producer
of the graphic rights and theatrical rights in the works," thereby requiring specific
enumeration of rights beyond audiovisual rights.).
170 Senate bill 2330 called for a similar variation on the German "transfer pur-
pose theory." See S. 2330, supra note 134, at § 2; cf. Black, The Regulation of Copy-
right Contracts: A Comparative View, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 386, 387 (Dec. 1980)
(describing the German "tranfer purpose theory"). Senate bill 2330, however, would
only have looked to the transferee's reasonable anticipation of use.
The reasonable expectations test does pose some potential difficulties for the inde-
pendent artist. Unlike the termination provisions, which can be effected without litiga-
tion, a reasonable expectations clause invites litigation. In general, cases involving inter-
pretation of the scope of the grantor's grant have come down in favor of the grantee.
See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1968).
Yet, the court's broad reading of grants by grantors has occurred absent restrictive
statutory language. A reasonable expectations clause should curtail overbroad reading
of intended grants even though it might not help the artist in a close case.
171 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (describing the experiences of
Ms. Brickman).
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1982) (providing that "[tiermination of the grant
may be effected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-
five years from the date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date
of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of
execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier").
17. Senate bill 2138 contained a provision that would have allowed an indepen-
dent contractor to bring an action to reform or terminate the transfer of a copyright
where the profits earned by the transferee were strikingly disproportionate. See S.
2138, supra note 133, at § 2(3). That proposal was opposed by the American Bar
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The publishers have vigorously opposed even this modest re-
form.1"4 The Association of American Publishers has argued that in the
case of encyclopedic works and instructional texts "subjecting discrete
segments of larger interwoven units . . . to myriad terminations of the
publisher's rights would be virtually intolerable. ' 17 6 Even though few
commercial works are likely to retain their vitality after thirty-five
years, they are apparently concerned with the administrability of a ter-
mination system and the possibility that they could lose rights to por-
tions of a finished work, thereby damaging the larger work. In an era
of computers and massive blanket licensing agreements, the adminis-
trability concern is not compelling. 17 Superficially, publishers' concern
with the ongoing integrity of their larger works is more compelling, but
the possibility of termination only requires that the publisher bargain a
second time with artists whose works have remained valuable beyond
the thirty-five or forty years. Hence, the publishers' objection is not
that their larger works are at risk, but rather that they will have to pay
for use beyond thirty-five or forty years, "robbing" them of the wind-
fall they currently enjoy when a commissioned work achieves unex-
pected long-term vitality.177 Thus, the deletion of subdivision (2) could
ensure commissioned artists a greater likelihood of receiving the true
lifetime value for their works. Their compensation would more accu-
rately reflect their actual contributions to society.
Two other legislative changes would be necessary to completely
rectify the artist's inability to bargain for fair compensation. First, Con-
gress should adopt an amendment requiring that contracts for transfer
of rights be entered into prior to commencement of the work so that the
publishers cannot extract more than anticipated rights after the artist
has already spent time, money, and effort on the work. 17 8 Second, as
Association and publishers largely on the grounds that a similar proposal had been
made during the copyright revision as early as 1961 as an alternative to the termination
provisions and had been defeated. Telephone interview with Tad Crawford, Counsel,
Graphic Artists Guild (Jan. 29, 1987).
174 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 135, at 120 (statement of Ms. Bella L. Linden
on behalf of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.).
17 Id. at 69 (statement of the American Ass'n of American Publishers, Inc.).
176 The accounting required for the termination procedures would entail nothing
more that keeping a record of who produced what on a given date. Termination is
initiated by the artist; the publisher's recordkeeping is not necessary to effect termina-
tion transfers, but only for a defense to an attempted termination. It might also be
possible to develop a blanket licensing system. See Note, supra note 140, at 1245.
177 For example, a publisher will end up paying more for a work, the value of
which was initially underestimated, if she is required to renegotiate the transfer after
35 years.
18 See supra note 148-52 and accompanying text (describing this bargaining tac-
tic of publishers). Senate bill 2138 included such a provision. See S. 2138, supra note
133, at § 2(2).
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will be discussed shortly, an early termination provision for uses con-
tracted for but not exercised within a certain period of time would en-
able artists, and society as a whole, to more fully enjoy the fruits of the
artists' labors. 1 9
3. Incentives to Create
Under the 1976 Act's commissioned work-made-for-hire provi-
sions, artists have been discouraged from producing the best works they
can and even from working as artists at all.1 80 The most significant
difficulty is that the publishers can remunerate an artist for the least
valuable aspects of her work, step into the artist's shoes as "author"
through the work-made-for-hire contract, and then put the work to
more valuable uses. This is a powerful disincentive to the production of
high quality, multi-use works.
Under United States copyright law, which does not explicitly rec-
ognize moral rights, incentive is primarily posited in economic terms.
Thus, the legislative correction that ensures the artists' remuneration is
fair would also restore incentive. Assuming that a definition of "em-
ployee" is appended to the work-made-for-hire provisions, and that
subdivision (2) is deleted, the most effective way to meet the commis-
sioned artists' incentive problem would be to insert a reasonable expec-
tations clause similar to the one mentioned above. The transfer of use-
rights should not exceed the uses the parties reasonably anticipate to be
exercised.1 81 This would provide artists with a weapon against unscru-
pulous publishers, who explicitly bargain for a less expensive use than
they intend to implement.
Congress should also consider a disclosure requirement for pub-
lishers. If publishers were required to list their anticipated uses of a
work, that list could provide a crucial element of the factual basis for
the parties' reasonable expectations. Such a disclosure requirement,
however, is unlikely to be effective by itself. Publishers would, in all
likelihood, respond to a disclosure requirement in the same way they
responded to subdivision (2): by producing standardized contract terms.
In the case of disclosure, they could list every possible use ever to be
contemplated for a type of work or they could describe the uses so
179 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
1"0 See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text. This treatment of transfers is
analagous to the shop-right doctrine found in patent law. A shop-right theory was
proposed during the 1976 Act's drafting, but not incorporated into the final draft. See
Gallay, supra note 79, at 578 (under shop-right doctrine, employer may use a work
only for business activities; other uses are reserved to the employee).
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vaguely that any type of use would be covered. Thus, while a disclosure
requirement might reduce some of the burden on the artist trying to
prove the parties' expectations, it is unlikely to be very effective. The
essential legislative change required to restore proper incentives to art-
ists to produce is the insertion of a reasonable expectations test.
4. Dissemination
For the public, the greatest harm produced by the 1976 Act's com-
missioned work-made-for-hire provisions is the potential reduction in
the dissemination of artworks. Indiscriminate use of work-made-for-
hire contracts leads inevitably to the stockpiling of works by publishers.
As was stated in the 1982 Hearings, the work-made-for-hire provisions
"ultimately inhibit the free flow of ideas and information which is so
precious to all Americans."1 2 Thus, legislative change is necessary to
free those works not being used by publishers that the artists would
promote if they had rights in them.
By defining the term "employee" and deleting subdivision (2),
Congress could restore to commissioned artists copyright in their works.
Artists, therefore, would have termination rights after thirty-five or
forty years," 8' and thus publishers' stockpiling would be reduced from
the present term of seventy-five years for works made for hire."" In the
case of the publisher, who only uses the work one time, though, that
still leaves more than thirty years for a work to lie dormant. Further-
more, even if a publisher exercises a use of the work for thirty-five
years, there may be many other uses for the work that remain unused
for more than thirty years. Thus, a termination provision that could be
effected by the commissioned artist for specific uses and in a shorter
time span is required if the public is to benefit from the greatest possi-
ble dissemination of artworks. Any right to usage not exercised by a
publisher within a five-year period, for example, could be subject to
termination by the artist."85 Thus, artists could free works that other-
wise might languor unused in hiring parties' warehouses or computers.
In summary, five legislative changes need to be undertaken if the
inequities produced by the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire provisions
182 See Hearing, supra note 135, at 21 (statement of Ms. June Roth, president,
American Society of Journalists and Authors, Inc.).
183 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1982).
184 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982).
185 Senate bill 2330 provided that "a partial termination may be effected at any
time during a period of five years beginning at the end of the period of three years after
the date of the execution of the grant. The termination shall apply to any usage permit-
ted under the grant which has not been exercised by publication. . . ." S. 2330, supra
note 134, at § 4.
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are to be corrected: (1) insertion of a definition of "employee"'into sub-
division (1); (2) deletion of subdivision (2); (3) insertion of a reasonable
expectations clause; (4) insertion of a clause requiring that contracts be
entered into prior to initiation of the work; and (5) insertion of a termi-
nation of individual use-rights provision.
CONCLUSION
Almost ten years have passed since the 1976 Act went into effect.
Now is a logical point at which to pause and take stock of how the Act
is working. This Comment has evaluated the 1976 Act's definition of
commissioned works made for hire found in section 101 and how that
definition has been judicially interpreted and practically implemented.
While some courts have interpreted the definition of works made
for hire found in section 101 consistently with its legislative history, the
court in Aldon Accessories and its progeny misinterpreted the definition
of commissioned works made for hire. Congress intended to limit appli-
cation of the work-made-for-hire doctrine to commissioned works in
two ways: (1) by limiting the categories of commissioned works availa-
ble for work-made-for-hire status by specifically enumerating only
those categories eligible; and (2) by requiring a written agreement
signed by both parties designating the work as a work made for hire.
The Aldon Accessories decision undercut both requirements by
designating statuary as works made for hire, even though statuary does
not fall into one of the nine enumerated categories and the hiring party
and the contractor signed no contract designating the work as a work
made for hire. The court in Aldon Accessories had strong reasons,
practical and equitable, to find that the plaintiff was the author of a
work made for hire. Yet, its interpretation of the provisions opened the
way for creators of commissioned works to lose rights in their works
even when they had signed neither a work-made-for-hire agreement
nor an assignment-of-rights agreement. The fact that the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted its reasoning without discussion makes this potential threat
even more disturbing.
The practical operation of the 1976 Act's commissioned work-
made-for-hire provisions has also contravened the purposes of copyright
legislation. With the widespread implementation of standard work-
made-for-hire agreements, it has become more difficult for artists and
authors to get fair remuneration. That, in turn, has reduced the incen-
tive for authors and artists to produce their best works or even to re-
main artists at all. Finally, the work-made-for-hire standardized con-
tracts have created the potential for publishers' stockpiling of artworks,
thereby reducing the greatest possible dissemination of works.
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Legislative change is required if these concerns are to be met.
Above all, Congress must provide a definition of "employee." The term
is crucial to proper interpretation of the work-made-for-hire provisions.
The 1909 Act's drafters avoided the task as did the 1976 Act's drafters.
The time has come to clarify the law for artists, publishers, and courts
alike. Such an amendment would go far toward remedying the ill ef-
fects of the Act's practical impact and the judicial misinterpretation.
In addition, Congress should consider deleting commissioned
works from the work-made-for-hire provisions altogether. If Congress
did, commissioned artists would still be subject to imposition of all-
rights contracts by publishers. Then, to even the widely disparate bar-
gaining powers of the individual authors and the publishers, Congress
should add two more provisions: (1) a reasonable expectations clause
and (2) a short-term termination provision for individual use-rights in
a work.
Copyright legislation is passed pursuant to the constitutional direc-
tive to "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . .the exclusive Right
to their respective writings." ' Legislative reform is necessary to re-
store to independent artists rights in their works. Absent reform, the
"compromise" reached in the 1976 Act's work-made-for-hire provisions
will continue to work in favor of the publishers and against artists.
.. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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